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The colonial representation of Jihadi John: mediated matters of life and death in 
the ‘war on terror’ 
Malcolm James 
 
On 19 August 2014 a video was uploaded to YouTube showing the beheading of US 
journalist James Foley by the man who later came to be known as Jihadi John. This 
was the first of seven videos depicting similar scenes. Distributed through YouTube 
and widely reported in the press, these videos became an important part of the 
argument about the barbarity and backwardness of ISIL (Islamic State of Iraq and the 
Levant) and the Muslim East. At the same time they became a focus for anxieties 
about ‘the enemy within’ – British-born supporters of ISIL, and by extension the 
wider British Muslim population. While seven Jihadi John videos have been released, 
this article analyses the first three, which were among the most widely disseminated 
and reported on. These videos show the executions of James Foley, British aid worker 
David Haines, and US-Israeli journalist Steven Sotloff. This article explores the 
colonial representation of Jihadi John in this context. It addresses how these images 
contributed to the war on terror’s aesthetics of terror, the significance of their 
mediated condition and how their representation contributed to on-going colonial 
violence. 
 
It should go without saying that there is no possible justification for these beheadings.  
The aim here, rather, is to show how the reception of the beheading videos helps 
contribute to the colonial binary of ‘us’ and ‘them’ that is deployed by the US, UK 
and ISIL to justify their campaigns. In the context of a further UK bombing campaign 
in Syria, the increased criminalisation of Muslims living in the UK, and extended 
aggressions in Syria and Iraq, this article makes a case for the valuing all human life 
and against the kinds of colonial representation that work to dehumanise some people 
so that their death (or oppression) becomes possible.  
 
Who is Jihadi John? 
Before entering into this analysis it is useful to establish how Jihadi John received his 
name. The moniker ‘Jihadi John’ was created by the Daily Mail to refer to the 
executioner in the first of the now notorious ISIL videos. According to the Mail, the 
name ‘John’ was given to one of four apparently British members of an ISIL cell 
called ‘the Beatles’ by a group of hostages. The other members were nicknamed 
Ringo, George and Paul.  
 
After the identification of Jihadi John as a British fighter, his real identity became a 
matter of intense speculation. At the end of August 2014, British papers reported that 
Londoner Abdel-Majed Abdel Bary, the son of Osama Bin Laden’s London 
spokesperson, was a key suspect. This construction of the terrorist threat ran alongside 
the story (reported by Evening Standard on 23 August 2014) that Abdel Bary was 
rapper L Jinny. There was therefore an implied connection between Abdel Bary’s 
supposed terrorist danger and longstanding concerns about the disconnection of black 
young men and black popular culture from white middle-class Britain.  
 
On 26 February 2015, The Washington Post identified Jihadi John as Mohammed 
Emwazi, a University of Westminster graduate. Jihadi John’s educational status then 
fed into a history of panics associated with home-grown terrorism; concerns which 
reached back to the period of British Irish Republican campaigns, and to the 2005 
London bombings.
i
 Emwazi’s participation in what were formerly the educational 
bastions of white middle-class Britain seemed to indicate that extremism and 
radicalisation were operating everywhere. It helped cement the idea that under every 
moderate Muslim mask was a closet extremist, a foreign enemy.
ii
 
 
Consequently, concerns about Emwazi’s liminal condition – between the lines of East 
and West – were aired. As with recent debates on the ‘Jihadi Bride’ school girls who 
left East London for Syria,
iii
 and longer standing concerns over the cultural location of 
second generational migrants, the public was asked to again consider the danger 
posed by those who disrupt the neat ordering of civilisational discourses. Emwazi’s 
seemingly unfathomable career change – from university student to ISIL executioner 
– drew attention to this dangerous grey zone. In his transformation from participant in 
the Western education-consumer-citizen myth, to Islamic terrorist; from model school 
pupil ‘little Mo’, bearer of society’s future, to barbarian, Jihadi John triggered the 
fears associated with the ‘good’ Muslim turned ‘bad’. He came to simultaneously 
symbolise the foreign jihadi, liminal threat, rapper and corrupted future.  
 
Following neoliberal discourse, this investment in Jihadi John the individual 
permitted renewed public fears to be made sense of through his personal failure 
towards others. Although his naming as ‘John’ was an accident of circumstance, this 
personal failure then became that of an English Everyman – a (liberal) John Bull – 
and the violation of that normative ideal.  
 
On Friday 13 November 2015 British prime minister David Cameron announced that 
Jihadi John had almost certainly been killed by a drone strike in central Raqqa, Syria. 
As with Saddam Hussain and Osama Bin Laden before him he had been ‘evaporated’ 
into the colonial ether – only to live on in the growing clamour for war.  
 
Culture talk and the spectacle of terrorism 
This construction of Jihadi John can only be understood in relation to the colonial 
discourses of the ‘war on terror’. 
 
As Edward Said has argued, colonial discourse on the Middle East is dominated by a 
civilisation divide between the West and Islam. More specifically, this divide is 
between secular modernity as forward-thinking and Islam as pre-modern and 
backward-thinking. In the war on terror these themes appear through the construction 
of the West as free, civilised and modern and the East as the inverse. Mahmood 
Mamdani refers to this kind of civilisational rhetoric as ‘culture talk’: a discourse that 
conveniently obfuscates historical and post-colonial analyses in favour of reductive 
cultural/racialised explanations for global events.
iv
 President George W Bush was a 
great enumerator of these binaries.  
 
We value life. The terrorists ruthlessly destroy it. We value education. The 
terrorists do not believe women should be educated or should have health care 
or should leave their homes. We value the right to speak our minds. For the 
terrorists free expression can be grounds for execution. We respect people of 
all faiths and welcome the free practice of religion.
v
  
 
In the UK, this culture talk built on the post-colonial construction of British Asians 
and Muslims. Formerly stereotyped as docile and effeminate, from the late 1980s 
onwards British Asians started to be racialised, alongside Islam and Muslims, as pre-
modern, barbaric and dangerous. Key moments in the development of this discourse 
include the Satanic Verses controversy of 1988 (when Salman Rushdie was issued 
with a fatwa by Iran’s Ayatollah Khomeini), the representation of the Gulf War in 
Iraq between 1990 and 1991, the Bradford Riots of 1995, the ‘Northern Disturbances’ 
of 2001 and the London bombing in 2005.  
 
However, the war on terror’s culture talk has not been confined to the US and UK. 
Osama Bin Laden, Abu Musab al Zarqawi (former leader of al-Qaeda in Iraq) and 
ISIL have also propagated these discourses. Indeed documents produced by ISIL and 
al-Qaeda define the elimination the ‘grey zone’ between the East-West binary as a 
key strategic objective. One tool in this strategy has been the beheading video.  
 
A series of beheading videos, attributed to Abu Musab al Zarqawi, appeared after the 
first invasion of Iraq, in 2004, distributed on websites and television networks across 
the US and UK. They included depiction of the deaths of US citizen Nicholas Berg 
and UK citizen Kenneth Bigley. Underlining the colonial divide, the video of Berg, 
dressed in an orange jumpsuit, stated that his beheading was a response to the 
treatment of Muslims in Abu Ghraib, the US’s Iraqi torture prison.  
 
Brought to public attention through the corporate circuitries of American digital 
media, Berg’s execution video became the most popular searched-for item on the 
Internet. Bigley’s video was not widely seen in the UK, but the actions of then prime 
minister Tony Blair ensured its notoriety in civilisational discourse. On hearing the 
news of Bigley’s death, Blair flew back from Washington to the UK conduct a bible 
reading at an Anglican service for the deceased man.  
 
The videos of Foley, Sotloff and Haines were similarly intended and received. Foley’s 
video entitled ‘a message to America’ shows Jihadi John, dressed in black, 
condemning the American attacks in Iraq and describing his action as a reprisal. The 
execution takes place in a desert scene, with Foley, in an orange jumpsuit, kneeling 
beneath Jihadi John. As with the former videos, the orange jumpsuit references the 
uniforms worn by detainees at Guantanamo Bay and Abu Ghraib. The video shows 
Jihadi John holding a knife to Foley’s throat. The following shot is of Foley’s 
decapitated head on his torso. The video ends with an image of Sotloff and a warning 
to Barack Obama that his fate depends on the President’s future actions. The 
executions of Sotloff and Haines were later shown in similar fashion. In the third 
video, Haines is required to blame his death on David Cameron for entering into 
coalition with the US against ISIL in Iraq. 
 
The beheading videos can be seen as an integral part of what Henry Giroux refers to 
as the ‘spectacle of terrorism’. This refers to the panoply of realist imagery associated 
with the war on terror, which as well as the beheading videos includes images of the 
collapse of the Twin Towers, aerial bombardments and cruise missile strikes. The 
spectacle of terrorism consists of imagery that appeals to fear, survival, death, life and 
security; it uses shock and awe to bypass democracy, debate and dialogue.
vi
  
 
While Giroux focuses on the US, the beheading videos in fact reveal how the 
spectacle or terrorism has proceeded through the interconnected involvement of the 
US and UK governments, al-Qaeda in Iraq, ISIL and corporate media and 
entertainment companies. Through the production of the videos, the management of 
their reception, and their distribution, these actors have ensured the continued 
prominence of civilisational discourses. They have also jointly contributed to its 
aesthetics.  
 
We are all only too familiar with the spectacles of terror: they are woven into the 
military-strategic aesthetics of the warring parties, and are developed in tandem with 
the media and entertainment industries. Thus the aesthetics of the multi-million dollar 
grossing Grand Theft Auto has directly influenced ISIL imagery;
vii
 while the aerial 
bombing scenes in Call of Duty bear close resemblance to the portrayal by the US and 
UK military of ‘successful’ Western airstrikes. This is in addition to the ubiquitous 
aesthetics of shock and awe used in embedded news footage, films such as Hurt 
Locker or Showtime’s hit series Homeland, and evoked in numerous political 
speeches. 
 
Colonial representations of killing 
This was the context in which the Jihadi John videos were interpreted when they came 
to UK public attention through both traditional and social media sources. In order to 
understand the colonial representations of the videos, and ultimately how their digital 
condition fed into a clamour for violence, it is first necessary to interrogate their 
presentation of killing. 
 
In his discussion of the philosophical dilemmas presented by drone warfare to theories 
of war, Grégoire Chamayou notes that, from the guillotine onwards, modern Europe 
has associated just killing with modern mechanical efficiency, and with the alienation 
of the killer from killed.
viii
 In this way, deaths from drones or cruise missile have 
come to be represented as moral, civilised and modern (regardless of who they kill or 
how they kill them). When mechanical killing at distance is represented as being 
modern and civilised, killing at close quarters represents what is pre-modern and 
uncivilised about the East. It is to this that prime minister David Cameron appealed 
when, following the release of the first video showing the death of James Foley, he 
cut short his holiday and returned to Downing Street to condemn ‘the barbaric and 
brutal act that [had] taken place’. Jihadi John’s own death in central Raqqa was 
acclaimed as a ‘clean hit’ and a just act by US and UK government officials – coming 
courtesy of a 45kg Hellfire missile shot from 10,000ft by a Predator drone operated 
from Creech Air Force Base, Nevada. 
 
The colonial representation of killing pertains not only to the methods of execution 
but also to the humanity of victims and the inhumanity of the killer. The faces of the 
victims reference their individual humanity, and a particular investment was made in 
the individual humanity of David Haines. It was widely reported that Haines had 
worked with refugees in Syria, South Sudan and Libya, was an aid worker and had a 
family. Correspondingly, he was represented as both a saviour of the Middle East and 
its victim. When reporting on the reactions of his family, and that of David Cameron, 
the press juxtaposed these dual statuses. Makau Mutua reminds us of the important 
role played by both the saviour and the victim in colonial discourse.
ix
 The saviour is 
the colonial figure who rescues the colonised victim from the savage. Although it may 
well not have been his own perspective, the death of Haines then provided an allegory 
for the civilising mission of the West and the threat posed to it by Islam. In the hands 
of British media and politicians, Haines became symbolic of the West’s thwarted 
benevolence, while Jihadi John became the symbol of Islam’s barbarity and its 
inherent threat to the West. Contrasted with the face of Haines, the hood of the 
executioner referenced the East’s inhumanity and pre-guillotine savagery.  
 
Jihadi John’s hood also functioned to represent the faceless masses, unnamed dead 
and dehumanised life forms that appear in colonial discourse as counterpoints to the 
humanity of the European. Indeed, the war on terror depends on these crude 
stereotypes for its prosecution. Chinua Achebe notes in his comments on Conrad’s 
Heart of Darkness the way in which the humanity of the white Europeans on the boat 
is counterposed to the faceless and frenzied black masses on the riverbank. Jihadi 
John’s hood functioned similarly in the UK to represent the war on terror’s 
infrahuman, thereby legitimising the West’s civilising mission.  
 
In this context of entrenched colonial binaries, the aid worker and two journalists 
became allegories for an unacceptable reversal of the normal patterns of dominance. 
Their subordination beneath Jihadi John became symbolic of the emasculation of the 
West by a generic and faceless Islam. As with the imagery of the Twin Towers under 
attack, this emasculation generated fear of the reversal of colonial and racial order. 
There are similarities here to Enoch Powell’s stoking of racist fears in his 1968 Rivers 
of Blood speech, in his imagery of ‘the black man [having] the whip hand over the 
white man’. 
 
Absence and the digital image 
These representations could only work because of the absences inherent in the 
imagery. Indeed, as Stuart Hall noted in ‘The Work of Representation’, visual 
representation works as much through what the image doesn’t tell us, as what it does.
x
  
 
In the first instance, the nature of the visual image means that it is limited in what it 
can reveal about the history and context of the moment in which it initially appeared. 
When it travels to different places, these absences have to be inferred and filled in by 
the viewer, using information provided to them by their own social and historical 
surroundings.
xi
 These absences thus allow visual images to be interpreted in different 
contexts in different ways.  
 
The digital condition of the Jihadi John videos further magnifies the absences of the 
analogue image. As with the analogue image, the digital image provides scarce 
commentary on the history and context of the videos. They don’t reveal the 
interrelated histories of ISIL and colonialism, or the broader political history of the 
war on terror. These absences make them open to interpretation. In the UK, where the 
understanding of the Middle East is dominated by the kinds of culture talk referenced 
above, they became over-determined by the civilisational divide narrative. They easily 
slotted into binary discourses on freedom and barbarism. Indeed, the framing of the 
videos encouraged this. The desert backdrop means there is very little information 
that can be interpreted from the surroundings. The actions shown, and the narratives 
the videos contain, are thus centre stage, inviting a Manichean interpretation.  
 
The digital distribution of the Jihadi John videos provided them with properties of 
speed and replication that exceeded earlier formats. In addition to their continual 
referencing in traditional media and political discourse, they appeared on platforms 
such as Twitter, YouTube, and regional social media – platforms that collectively 
have more than one billion daily views. Through these platforms, and the wider media 
ecology of mobile phones and other digital devices, the videos were extensively 
replicated and hyperlinked. As Rubenstein and Sluis put it, they moved through the 
digital network in several directions at once, ‘decomposing and recombining, 
multiplying and aggregating into different contexts’.
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 They could be viewed 
everywhere at the same time. This exacerbated the absences already noted, and left 
them more radically open to colonialist interpretation in different social contexts.  
 
These kinds of interpretation were compounded by the intensity associated with social 
media. Because of the perception of speed and immediacy that accompanies YouTube 
and other social media platforms, viewers were given the impression not that the 
beheadings had happened – as is usually the case with analogue images – but that 
they were happening. The relatively high resolution of the image and the close 
relationship that viewers maintain with their various screens heightened this intimate 
aesthetic engagement. It compounded the affective registers of fear and anxiety 
through its return to the spectacle of terror.  
 
The digital format also allows for manipulation. The Daily Telegraph revealed that 
the video depicting the beheading of James Foley might not actually show a 
beheading at all; instead it was a montage of the act – taking advantage of camera 
trickery, slick post-production techniques and the extreme malleability of digital 
code.
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 This posed the question: what kind of reality are dominant interpretations 
based on? However, this dimension of the videos received scant mainstream attention. 
This was not only because it called into question the truth claims of the video’s 
dominant interpretations, but also, and maybe more importantly, because it was 
entirely congruent with the realist simulacra of the war on terror.   
 
Jihadi John videos and the justification of colonial violence  
Returning one last time to Stuart Hall, we are reminded that these videos were not 
only a site of representation, but also an event through which meaning and action 
could be generated. And although it is impossible to isolate the effects that the Jihadi 
John videos had on local or global politics, or to disentangle them from the effects 
produced by other actions that were occurring at the time, it is useful to reflect on the 
ways in which they contributed to the justification for colonial violence, and in 
particular to calls for war abroad and criminalisation of Muslims in the UK.  
 
All this is not to detract from the ways in which these videos have contributed to the 
recruitment and political strategies of ISIL in the Middle East. For those interested, 
scholars of international relations have paid substantial attention to this dimension of 
their work. However, given the recent vote in the House of Commons to bomb Syria, 
it seems appropriate to end this article by addressing how the videos form part of the 
armoury through which the case for another Western bombing war has been made, 
and, conjointly, how this relates to the criminalisation of Muslims in the UK. 
 
The first beheading video was released on YouTube on 14 August 2014, followed by 
two others on 2 and 13 September. These videos played a role in undermining the 
opposition to bombing Syria that had resulted in a parliamentary defeat for prime 
minister Cameron at the end of August. Thus on 26 September 2014, with the support 
of Liberal Democrat and Labour MPs, the Conservative leadership won a vote – 524 
to 43 – in favour of UK support for the new US bombing campaign in Iraq. In the 
motion the following words were used:  
 
This House condemns the barbaric acts of ISIL against the peoples of Iraq 
including the Sunni, Shia, Kurds, Christians and Yazidi and the humanitarian 
crisis this is causing; recognises the clear threat ISIL poses to the territorial 
integrity of Iraq and the request from the Government of Iraq for military 
support from the international community and the specific request to the UK 
Government for such support; further recognises the threat ISIL poses to wider 
international security and the UK directly through its sponsorship of terrorist 
attacks and its murder of a British hostage; acknowledges the broad coalition 
contributing to military support of the Government of Iraq including countries 
throughout the Middle East. 
 
Echoing the colonialist language of the war on terror, the motion used barbarism and 
the death of a British hostage to justify an air attack that would cause civilian deaths. 
This action was framed as part of a just and humanitarian war.  
 
At the same time, arguments in favour of surveillance and criminalisation of Muslims 
in the UK were intensified. In November 2014, Metropolitan Police Chief Hogan 
Howe responded to the backlash against surveillance following the Edward Snowden 
revelations by invoking the threat of home-grown terrorism as a justification for 
greater interception powers. He warned that the Internet was a prime Jihadi recruiting 
device. Meanwhile, echoing the sentiment of the Counter Terrorism Bill that was at 
that point passing through parliament, Mark Rowley, Assistant Metropolitan Police 
Commissioner and lead for national counter-terrorism, prefaced his comments on the 
need for community (i.e. Muslim community) vigilance with the observation that:  
 
Every reasonable person in the country has been touched by the pitiless 
murder of James Foley at the hands of Islamic State terrorists, and the 
murderer’s apparent British nationality has focused attention on extremism in 
the UK as well as the Middle East.  
 
That is to say, the videos provided a context in which continued colonial violence 
could be argued for, while any discussion about the relationship between security, 
colonial war, racialisation and marginalisation could be bypassed.  
 
The reported death of Jihadi John on Friday 13 November 2015 provided a similar 
opportunity. Highlighting the immediacy of the moment, David Cameron cut short his 
Chequers conference with Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi and rushed to 
Downing Street to make the announcement. Drawing attention to the clean and just 
action that had almost certainly ended the life of Jihadi John, he sought to prepare 
anew the grounds for bombing Syria. In the event, that moment was short-lived: on 
the same day the attacks in Paris occurred. That led directly to the vote to extend 
Britain’s bombing campaign in the Middle East to Syria.  
 
At a time when it is again difficult to know humanity beyond the pitfalls of culture 
talk, the history of the Jihadi John videos should caution us against the further 
entrenchment of racial, colonial and civilisational discourses, and on the basis of this 
prompt us to engage in a robust interrogation of the same to the end of charting a 
renewed humanism. 
 
Thanks to Claire Alexander, Nabila Munawar, Naaz Rashid and Sivamohan Valluvan 
for commenting on earlier drafts of this paper. 
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